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THE POST-CRISIS AND ITS CRITICS 
David Zaring*
Many observers believe that the government has not done enough to 
regulate the financial system.
 
1  In this essay, I consider — and reject — the 
claims of those who believe the government has done too much.  Three 
post-crisis government interventions in the marketplace exemplify, I think, 
the way the public sector has involved itself in the private sector during the 
aftermath of the bailout passed by Congress at the heart of the crisis.  Some 
view these sorts of interventions as a threat to capitalism and even as a 
threat to freedom itself.2  They worry that the government has started to 
erase the distinction between public and private in finance, and argue that 
any continuing intervention in the sector is prone to mismanagement and 
politicization.3
 
 * Assistant Professor, Legal Studies Department, Wharton School of Business. 
  The question I will address here is:  are they right to worry? 
 1. See, e.g., Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Has Wall Street Captured Washington?, 12 U. 
PA. J. BUS. L. (forthcoming 2010); Simon Johnson, The Quiet Coup, THE ATLANTIC, May 
2009, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/200905/imf-advice. 
 2. I would have expected to be discussing a fourth government intervention that 
usually marks financial crises, but that has not yet marked this one.  This is a threat to 
freedom—particularly the freedom of the executives of crisis firms.  It is the threat of 
criminal prosecution, and it is the shoe that has not dropped in the aftermath of the current 
financial crisis.  People go to jail after financial crises, even though it is hardly obvious that 
the singling out of a few executives for jail time is the right way to police business 
mismanagement.  Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 
361 (2008).  The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB)—today’s Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS)—referred 11,000 cases to the Department of Justice (DOJ) in 1987 and 
1988.  By 1992, there had been 1,000 convictions, and a reported conviction rate of 91%.  
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) concluded that, of the 26 largest thrift 
failures, 60% had been marred by “serious criminal activity.”  The Resolution Trust 
Corporation (RTC) said criminal fraud was a significant contributor to the failure of 33% of 
its institutions.  KITTY CALAVITA ET AL., BIG MONEY CRIME:  FRAUD AND POLITICS IN THE 
SAVING AND LOAN CRISIS 29 (1997).  Yet, during this crisis, the executives of collapsed 
institutions have not yet been indicted for the most part.  Two BSC fund managers heavily 
invested in subprime were recently acquitted.  And while, in light of the many ongoing 
investigations, it is likely that there will be prosecutions of crisis firms, it appears that this 
crisis will be unlike prior ones with regard to the number of executives who are prosecuted. 
 3. Some economists seem particularly skeptical of almost any government 
intervention in the marketplace, particularly those made during and before the financial 
crisis.  For the views of four such economists from the University of Chicago (Gary Becker, 
Kevin Murphy, Anil Kashyup, and Steve Kaplan), the Booth School has a useful podcast.  
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My answer is no.  I will not attempt to resolve whether the bailout 
“worked” in this article, or attempt to justify public interventions in private 
markets using bailouts — that would be a tall order.4  The bailout did 
stabilize plummeting financial markets, even if it did so at high pecuniary 
and other costs, but I take this initial government intervention as a given, 
one that affected the markets, and am particularly interested in the slow, 
rather than rapid, retreat from market intervention that has happened since.5
The bailout has led to continuing government oversight over the 
recipients of the funds.  The ongoing presence of government in the 
business sector blurs the public-private distinction and evidences the 
government’s role in business practices in which, as recently as 2007, it 
would not have dreamed of overseeing.  But the regulators did not ask for 
the roles they were given in the aftermath of the collapse of the financial 
markets.  And as the government’s crisis response matures, its market 
interventions have begun to look more and more prosaic.  In fact, the 
government has acted as any other investor might in some cases, while in 
others it is doing things to the financial system that it has done many times 
before – and that investors expect the government to do.  The government’s 
post-crisis roles as private equity manager and insolvency cleanup 
specialist are the sorts of tasks that we want it to take on, at least in 
extraordinary times – and they are essentially the same sort of services that 
we would expect of vulture funds and cramdown specialists in the private 
sector to provide were the intervention not to have happened. 
 
Before detailing the reasons for sanguinity about the government’s 
post-crisis participation in the capital markets, it is worth recognizing that 
there were reasons to worry about it before it took shape.  The government 
practiced creative administrative procedure in the depths of the crisis, 
which, though perhaps not unlawful, undoubtedly was an example of how 
far regulators can push their legislative mandates.6
 
Gary Becker et al., Faculty, Chicago Booth School, The Future of Markets Panel at the 57th 
Annual Management Conference (May 29, 2009), 
http://www.chicagobooth.edu/multimedia/podcast/?play=http://chicagobooth.edu/multimedi
a/audio/2009-05-29-ManConKeynote.mp3#02:07:32.  And of course, there are legal 
academics sympathetic to that traditional Chicago approach.  See Richard Epstein, Greed or 
Incentives?  The Moral of the Markets Story, FORBES, Sept. 22, 2008, 
http://www.forbes.com/2008/09/22/libertarian-mortgage-lease-oped-
cx_re_0923epstein.html (discussing reasons for the traditional Chicago approach). 
  Many of the pre-
 4. Scholars still do not agree if government action alleviated or exacerbated the Great 
Depression.  Robert Whaples, Where is There Consensus Among American Economic 
Historians? The Results of a Survey on Forty Propositions, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 139 (1995), 
available at http://www.jstor.org/pss/2123771.  No doubt the debate about the empirical 
consequences of the financial crisis bailout will rage for some time to come. 
 5. The risks of moral hazard associated with bailouts, for example, have long been 
chewed over.  See infra note 14 (discussing such risks after bailouts). 
 6. Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by Deal:  The Government's 
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Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) steps taken by the 
government during the financial crisis — a forced sale of Bear Stearns, the 
opening of the Fed’s discount window to investment banks and eventually 
AIG, the creation on the fly of a money market fund (MMF) insurance 
program by the Treasury, not to mention a number of unprecedented asset 
guarantee programs — were justified by stretched and creative 
interpretations of often broad Great Depression-era statutes, and by a turn 
to deals and to the Federal Reserve's ability to print money when the 
statutes would not serve.7  By relying on the Federal Reserve and the 
Treasury Department, the government turned to two agencies that have 
never been immersed in the world of administrative procedure.8  These 
agencies frequently do not follow the usual practice of notice and 
comment, do not often get sued by regulated industries, and have a 
relationship with the Federal Register, the Office of Management and 
Budget, and the D.C. Circuit that must make them the envy of the more 
closely supervised Environmental Protection Agency and Securities and 
Exchange Commission.9
The pre-legislation action by these agencies was innovative and 
unprecedented, both in procedure and substance — and lawyers tend to 
worry when agencies throw out the rulebook, as Treasury and the Fed did 




Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 463 (2009); Patricia A. McCoy et al., 
Systemic Risk Through Securitization:  The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 
41 CONN. L. REV. 493 (2009); Saule T. Omarova, The New Crisis for the New Century:  
Some Observations on the “Big-Picture” Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis of 2008, 13 
N.C. BANKING INST. 157 (2009). 
  The passage of more 
comprehensive legislation hardly allayed concerns about radical 
intervention in the economy.  To be sure, the comprehensive bailout, or 
TARP, was authorized by Congress, which softened the legitimacy 
problems posed by prior emergency measures promulgated by 
 7. See Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 6 (discussing the government’s response to the 
financial crisis). 
 8. Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy:  Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1153 (2008), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1124576;  Kristin E. Hickman, Coloring 
Outside the Lines:  Examining Treasury’s Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act 
Rulemaking Requirement, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727 (2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=955929. 
 9. David Zaring, Administration by Treasury, 94 MINN. L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 
2010). 
 10. So do economists.  See Viral Acharya, David Backus, & Raghu Sundaram, 
Government Money Should Have Strings Attached, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, 
http://blogs.ft.com/economistsforum/2009/01/government-money-should-have-strings-
attached/ (observing and criticizing that “[t]here is a tendency in a crisis to throw out the 
rulebook: we are in a unique situation, some will say, and that calls for unique measures”). 
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unaccountable bureaucrats and applied to AIG, Bear Stearns, and the 
MMFs.  But the TARP was also a massive and unprecedented economic 
intervention that delegated astonishing amounts of cash and authority to the 
Secretary of the Treasury.11  Gary Lawson has concluded that the 
government’s response to the financial crisis was unconstitutionally 
unmoored from Congressional instruction.12  J.W. Verret has argued that 
the Treasury Department’s interventions in the economy are alarming on a 
variety of policy grounds.13
And finally, it is worth noting — though it has not been proven in this 
case, I think — that turning an economic crisis into something that turns on 
government intervention creates its own degree of uncertainty, not to 
mention undesirable incentives for business.  The moral hazard problems 
have been explored in great detail by a number of scholars.
 
14  And John 
Taylor has argued that uncertainty about what the government was going to 
do with regard to a bailout was the cause of the collapse in the stock market 
in the fall of 2008, rather than market events such as the Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy.15
In sum, if lawyers get paid to worry, there are plenty of reasons to 
worry about government intrusions in the marketplace once the markets 
stabilized, coming as they have on the heels of an intervention that to 
looked creative at best, and, to free market purists, terribly uncertain.  But 
in this case, it is easy to worry too much, and far too many observers have 
 
 
 11. Steven M. Davidoff, The ‘Compromises’ in the Bailout Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 
2008, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/09/29/the-compromises-in-the-bailout-bill/. 
 12. Gary Lawson, Burying the Constitution Under a Trap, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
(forthcoming 2010), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1436462. 
 13. J.W. Verret, Treasury Inc.:  How the Bailout Reshapes Corporate Theory and 
Practice (Geo. Mason L. & Econ. Research, Paper No. 09-43, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1461143. 
 14. See, e.g., Richard M. Hynes, Securitization, Agency Costs, and the Subprime Crisis, 
4 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 231, 236 (2009) (”[T]he moral hazard created by the ability of lenders 
to shift losses to taxpayers.”); Karl S. Okamoto, After the Bailout: Regulating Systemic 
Moral Hazard, 57 UCLA L. REV. 183, 183 (2009) (discussing the challenges posed by 
systemic moral hazard in crafting a regulatory response to the Financial Crisis); Eric A. 
Posner & Luigi Zingales, A Loan Modification Approach to the Housing Crisis, 11 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 575, 582 (2009) (“And even if the plan works as intended, it will cost taxpayers 
billions of dollars and potentially exacerbate moral hazard by revealing to market 
participants a standing government willingness to subsidize lenders and borrowers when 
financial crises strike.”).  For an informal discussion of why we should not worry so much 
about moral hazard during the financial crisis, see Tim Harford, Bailouts Are Inevitable, 
Even Desirable, SLATE, Oct. 4, 2008, http://www.slate.com/id/2201343/. 
 15. Too Big To Fail:  The Role for Bankruptcy and  Antitrust Law in Financial 
Regulation Reform:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Commercial and Administrative Law 
of the H. Comm. On the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of John B. Taylor, 
Stanford University), available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/Taylor091022.pdf. 
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been doing exactly that.16
To support this inference, we must take the worst (while nonetheless 
exemplary) cases, and carefully consider whether they represent 
overweening government intervention in private ordering.  I first consider 
the government’s regulation of executive compensation, in particular the 
executive compensation rules imposed by Kenneth Feinberg, the so-called 
“TARP Compensation Czar.”
  To understand why I have more equanimity than 
some about the ongoing oversight, I would like to look at three of the most 
dramatic ways that the government has been intervening in business, and 
explain why things are not quite as bad as some fear.  The record has 
important implications for public choice and other skeptical theories of 
regulation.  Rather than reflexively critiquing every government 
intervention in the market, if government organizations look like other 
market participants and organizations – like financial intermediaries, 
venture capital funds, and the like – then the case for concern is much less 
serious 
17
I. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 
  Second, I consider the investment 
management practiced by the government of its stakes in bailed out firms.  
In particular, I examine the stakes it has been willing to sell back to firms, 
but that it has not given up as quickly as it possibly could.  Finally, I 
consider the slightly different exercise of government power posed by 
resolution authority, under which the government seizes, with very little 
process, banks or thrifts that it deems to be insolvent.  None of my reviews 
of these actions are meant to be comprehensive.  For the purposes of this 
article, the goal is not only to understand what the government did, but also 
to understand why it fails to represent a blow to the heart of capitalism. 
Some have argued that the government should regulate banker pay,18
 
 16. See Posting of David Zaring to The Conglomerate, It’s The Market Too, Buddy, 
http://www.theconglomerate.org/2009/12/dont-forget-the-market-failures-that-caused-the-
finanical-crisis.html (Dec. 3, 2009) (noting that much of the financial crisis commentary has 
focused on identifying the ways that the government policy precipitated each and every one 
of the problems). 
 
 17. See Deborah Solomon, White House Set to Appoint a Pay Czar, WALL ST. J., June 
5, 2009, at A2, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124416737421887739.html 
(reporting on the planned appointment of Kenneth Feinberg as a “Special Master for 
Compensation” to ensure that companies receiving federal bailout funds are abiding by 
executive-pay guidelines).  For a discussion of Feinberg’s ad hoc position as compensation 
czar, see his testimony to the House Financial Services Committee.  Press Release, Special 
Master for TARP Executive Compensation Kenneth R. Feinberg Testimony Before the 
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Oct. 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg334.htm. 
 18. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Holger Spamann, Regulating Bankers’ Pay, 98 GEO. L.J. 
247, 250-51 (2010) (discussing how pay regulation can complement and reinforce the 
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but many others view the public oversight of private compensation 
arrangements as very problematic.19
The government has not regulated executive compensation at private 
firms much in the past; after the bailout it has done so for the largest 
recipients of TARP funds.  But it has done so by asking Kenneth Feinberg, 
dubbed the so-called “TARP Compensation Czar” and a respected 
Washington lawyer, to examine the pay packages of senior executives of 
those companies that received extraordinary assistance from the 
government.
  Compensation is a relationship 
between parties that have every incentive to press their interests.  Should 
we be in the business of regulating executive compensation, and if so, 
exactly what sort of salaries or paydays should we intervene in?  And so 
on. 
20  Feinberg engaged in a lengthy, executive-by-executive 
negotiated process to set compensation at these companies.  Although the 
precise details of specific compensation packages are not easy to come by, 
the broad outlines have been widely publicized.21
 
traditional forms of financial regulation). 
  The Feinberg process cut 
cash compensation for executives at affected firms, on average by 50%, 
and generally resulted in an average cash compensation of not more than 
$500,000 per executive — a substantial payday, but less than many of the 
 19. See, e.g., William W. Bratton, The Academic Tournament Over Executive 
Compensation, 93 CAL. L. REV. 1557, 1559 (2005) (providing an overview of the literature 
on executive pay); John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay, & Randall S. Thomas, Is U.S. CEO 
Compensation Inefficient Pay Without Performance?, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1142, 1144 (2005) 
(suggesting that it is not clear that there are systematic failures in U.S. executive 
compensation); Obama to Slash Exec Pay at Bailout Firms, Professor Bainbridge.com, 
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2009/10/obama-to-slash-
exec-pay-at-bailout-firms.html (Oct. 21, 2009) (commenting that by regulation executive 
compensation the Obama administration has shown a shocking disregard for the rule of law 
and contract rights); The Stupid Bailout Pay Caps, Ideoblog, 
http://busmovie.typepad.com/ideoblog/2009/02/the-stupid-bailout-pay-caps.html (Feb. 4, 
2009, 10:59 AM) (remarking that the proposed pay caps are “blindingly stupid” and threaten 
to impede economic recovery).  For an interesting overview of an earlier fight about 
regulating executive compensation of publically traded companies, see Harwell Wells, “No 
Man Can Be Worth $1,000,000 A Year”:  The Fight Over Executive Compensation in 1930s 
America, 44 U. RICH. L. REV. 689 (2010) (discussing the history of fights over executive 
pay). 
 20. Feinberg won plaudits for his handling of the compensation for the victims of the 
9/11 attacks.  For a recent profile, see Elizabeth Kolbert, The Calculator, THE NEW YORKER, 
Nov. 25, 2002, at 42, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2002/11/25/021125fa_fact (profiling Kenneth Feinberg 
and his role as the Special Master of the Victim Compensation Fund after 9/11); see also 
Frances Romero, Biography of Kenneth Feinberg Compensation Czar, TIME, Oct. 23, 2009, 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1903547,00.html (collecting facts and 
quotations about Kenneth Feinberg). 
 21. Deborah Solomon & Aaron Lucchetti, Got TARP? If So, Pay Czar Plans 
Compensation Review, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2010, at C1. 
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affected were used to getting.22  Feinberg also eliminated many of the perks 
that corporate executives enjoy, such as corporate jet travel and country 
club memberships.  However, he often permitted deferred stock 
compensation in excess of cash, which, of course, raised salaries 
commensurately.23
Perhaps even more portentously, the Fed has announced that it would 
also review compensation practices at institutions that it regulated—a 
potentially very broad commitment indeed, given that the Fed supervises 




As of this writing, it is too soon to know what the Fed will do, or 
indeed, whether it will do anything.  It is also important to remember what 
the TARP pay oversight was not.  The TARP Pay Czar process was set up 
not to try to pass definitive rules about bonuses, but to delegate the making 
of particularized bonus determinations to a part-time mediator for a brief 
job that would be eliminated once the TARP recipients paid back their 
money.  The ostensible reason for this delegation laid in the care that had to 
be taken when regulating executive compensation.
  But while a Pay Czar and Federal Reserve review might look 
like a striking post-crisis intervention in free employment markets, there is 
less to the Feinberg pay regulation than meets the eye, while the Fed’s 
efforts have been cautious indeed. 
25 The Pay Czar could 
tailor specific compensation plans to the specific business plans of the 
government charges.26
 
 22. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Interim Final Rule on TARP Standards 
for Compensation & Corporate Governance (July 1, 2009), available at 
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/tg_0609b2009.html. 
  He could pay AIG executives in ways that would 
incentivize the winding up of the firm at the best terms for the government.  
 23. Id.; see also Stephen Labaton, U.S. Will Order Pay Cuts At Firms With Bailout Aid, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/22/business/22pay.html?_r=3&hp (discussing how 
Feinberg’s plan places tight limits on pay and perks, as well as changes the form of pay to 
align the personal interests of executives with the longer-term financial health of the 
companies). 
 24. See Press Release, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal 
Reserve Issues Proposed Guidance on Incentive Compensation (Oct. 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20091022a.htm (“The Federal 
Reserve Board on Thursday issued a proposal designed to ensure that the incentive 
compensation policies of banking organizations do not undermine the safety and soundness 
of their organizations.”). 
 25. Deborah Solomon, Pay Czar Gets Broad Authority over Executive Compensation, 
WALL ST. J., June 11, 2009, at A4. 
 26. See Podcast:  Regulating Executive Compensation:  Ought There to be a Law? 
(Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs Sept. 29, 
2009), available at http://uc.princeton.edu/main/index.php/home-mainmenu-1/28-all-
videos/5003-regulating-executive-compensation-ought-there-to-be-a-law [hereinafter 
Regulating Executive Compensation Podcast] (discussing powers of TARP Pay Czar). 
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He might take a different approach to Citibank executives, who were 
arguably expected to participate in the sort of lending that could help bring 
the country out of an economic crisis. 
But that justification for particularized pay packages is not at all 
inconsistent with the possibility that the government was not that interested 
in making broad and general statements about appropriate executive 
compensation.  By delegating the compensation question to Feinberg, the 
government made it possible for executives at most bailed out institutions 
to receive paydays that were not incommensurate with the paydays they 
were getting before they needed government assistance, only with deferred 
stock in the place of cash, and with far fewer perks. 
I also find perk regulation to be modest regulation indeed.  It has 
always been politically popular to go after country club memberships, 
limousines or company cars, and so on, and the TARP Pay Czar did all 
those things.  But of course, the regulation of perks for certain executives 
probably amounted to something in the low millions of dollars worth of 
government oversight—a modest regulatory imposition, though it certainly 
sounded good in newspaper headlines.27
Moreover, the focus of the compensation limits was to change cash 
compensation to deferred stock compensation.  Again, this is hardly 
command and control compensation regulation; it leaves the level of 
compensation up to the company, but regulates the type of pay executives 
receive, at least as practiced in the bailout.  Moreover, deferred stock is a 
method of payment beloved by many economists because it aligns the 
short-term incentives of executives and workers at firms with the longer-
term incentives of the shareholders who own the firms.
 
28  Investment banks 
have increasingly implemented deferred compensation arrangements for 
their own executives.29
Finally, it is also worth remembering that the TARP Czar's 
compensation only applied to seven recipients of particularly extraordinary 
government largesse, including AIG, Citigroup, Bank of America, 
 
 
 27. The New York Times article regarding the pay czar’s regulation of executive 
compensation appeared as the paper’s lead business story on October 13, 2009.  Mary 
Williams Walsh, U.S. Pay Czar Tries Again to Trim A.I.G. Bonuses, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 
2009, at B1.  See also Labaton, supra note 23 (discussing the effect of the regulation plan). 
 28. See Faqs.org, Abstracts:  Stock and compensation; Agency Costs, Risk 
Management, and Capital Structure; Agency, Delayed Compensation, and the Structure of 
Executive Remuneration, http://www.faqs.org/abstracts/Business/Stock-and-compensation-
Agency-costs-risk-management-and-capital-structure.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2010) 
(collecting articles analyzing deferred compensation arrangements). 
 29. See The Epicurean Dealmaker, Nature Red in Tooth and Claw:  Part II, 
http://epicureandealmaker.blogspot.com/2009/09/nature-red-in-tooth-and-claw-part-ii.html 
(Sept. 25, 2009 17:39 PM).  Of course, investment banks and other financial intermediaries 
also use these packages to create handcuffs to keep executives with the firm and prevent 
them from leaving for competitors. 
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Chrysler, GM, GMAC, and Chrysler Financial.30  Thus, regardless of the 
drama surrounding the idea of the government regulating executive 
compensation, only a few firms have ever had to deal with it, and then only 
on a one-time basis for as long as they remain under government 
supervision.  Two of these seven firms, Citigroup and Bank of America, 
were the first to get out of government supervision, while the rest have 
been following as fast as they can.31
Executive compensation regulation so far has proceeded by model, 
rather than by fiat.
 
32  The government has hoped that its approach might 
inspire financial intermediaries to take similar approaches to the way that 
they compensate their own executives.33
In sum, the government’s executive compensation regulation after the 
financial crisis has been of a sort that most principal-agent theorists endorse 
(and that investment banks themselves practice), that affected very few 
financial intermediaries, and that is short in duration.  It is a light touch 
example of government regulation that neither looks severe, broad, nor 
even a very bad idea. 
  Regulation by model is a modest 
way of enacting compensation regulation, and whether one concludes that 
it is a good or bad thing, it’s voluntariness makes it difficult to conclude 
that it is an overweening thing. 
II. INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT BY GOVERNMENT SUPERVISORS 
After appropriating money for a systematic bailout, the government 
took stock in a number of financial and auto companies.  It has not divested 
its holdings as fast as it possibly could.  There are a number of essentially 
nationalized firms that would have failed during the crisis had it not been 
for an injection of government funds—either in the form of debt guarantees 
or equity.  These firms included Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG, Chrysler, 
 
 30. Pay Czar Issues More Rulings on TARP Execs, ABC NEWS/MONEY, Apr. 16, 2010, 
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/wireStory?id=10395489; Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the 
Treasury, Kenneth R. Feinberg, Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation, Written 
Testimony before the House Financial Services Committee (Feb. 25, 2010, 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg565.htm. 
 31. Special Master for TARP Executive Compensation, Written Testimony before the 
House Financial Services Committee (Feb. 25, 2010, 
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg565.htm. 
 32. See Regulating Executive Compensation Podcast, supra note 26 (discussing actions 
of TARP Pay Czar). 
 33. Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. 
REV. 1151, 1201 (2010) (“Although the pay czar has formal jurisdiction over only a handful 
of bailout recipients such as AIG and General Motors, the Obama Administration has 
expressed a hope that other firms will treat his approach as a “best practice” that they too 
should follow.”). 
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and General Motors.34
Moreover, although many of the largest banks have already repaid 
their TARP funds, many other smaller institutions continue to retain their 
government investments, which took a form between debt and equity, and 
included preferred stock.
  The government has made it clear that its ownership 
stake in these and other firms may last for years, not months. 
35
This has always been a country in which there are very few 
nationalized government industries or institutions.  There has been a fear 
that politics could play a role in the decisions made by partly nationalized 
auto companies, insurance companies, and mortgage guarantors.  
Moreover, there has been some evidence in the past that there may be some 
reason to worry that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, for example, may have 
made some of the lending decisions they made because they were strongly 
encouraged to do so by Congress.
 The banking sector bounced back quickly in 
2009; why does had the government continued to hold shares in these 
intermediaries after that year has ended? 
36
Should we worry about this government imposition into the private 
sector?  I am sanguine.  There has not been much evidence that the 
government has been politicizing its ownership of financial institutions.
  Government ownership of these 
companies could, in theory, make the politicization of resource allocation 
hard to resist. 
37
 
 34. Hollis Colquhoun, Treasury Announces 2010 Guidelines for TARP Executive Pay, 
TECHNORATI, Apr. 20, 2010, http://technorati.com/business/article/treasury-announces-
2010-guidelines-for-tarp/ 
  
 35. ProPublica, Eye on the Bailout, Bailout Timeline:  Another Day, Another Bailout, 
http://bailout.propublica.org/main/timeline/index (last visited May 9, 2010) (tracking the 
disbursement and payment of bailouts on a daily basis).  Preferred stock, because it has a 
claim on the assets of the firm ahead of common stock, but is not precisely identical to a 
bond or a loan, occupies a nebulous position between debt and equity.  Anthony P. Polito, A 
Modest Proposal Regarding Debt-Like Preferred Stock, 20 VA. TAX REV. 291, 292-93 
(2000) (“Preferred stock, it goes without saying, rests at some intermediate point between 
corporate debt and common stock along the spectrum of corporate financing.  Common 
stock represents the ‘real’ equity of a corporation, whereas preferred stock typically lacks 
many of the indicia of paradigmatic equity (lacking both voting rights and unlimited 
potential for gain, but having dividend and liquidation preferences)”). 
 36. See Podcast:  Chicago Booth Podcast:  The Future of Markets, held by the 
University of Chicago Booth School of Business (June 29, 2009), 
http://www.chicagobooth.edu/multimedia/podcast/?play=http://chicagobooth.edu/multimedi
a/audio/2009-05-29-ManConKeynote.mp3#02:07:32 (discussing possible congressional 
influence on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac). 
 37. The auto companies may be somewhat different; for example, the government has 
replaced one CEO of GM.  See Mike Allen & Josh Gerstein, GM CEO Resigns at Obama's 
Behest, POLITICO, Mar. 29, 2009, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0309/20625.html.  
But it may not be so different; for example, the administration has not expressly interfered 
with the business plans of GM and Chrysler, and the President said that he has better things 
to do than run auto companies.  Posting of Brian Montopoli to Political Hotsheet, Obama:  
We Don't Want To Run GM, 
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Regarding financial intermediaries, the government has urged banks to 
lend, but when they have not done so, it has not conditioned TARP 
repayments, tried to vote its stock, or participated in the management of the 
companies in order to encourage lending.  There is no sign that the 
government has instructed the automakers to sell particular cars, or 
instructed AIG on which units it should divest. 
Instead, I suspect the model for how the government has managed its 
new investments is at least no different from, and possibly more modest 
than that of other private investors.  We might even expect a private equity 
vulture investor to interfere more in the management of a desperate 
company in which it has taken a saving stake.38
Thus, one question is whether we ought to worry so much about what 
the government might do, given that the private sector is not so constricted.  
Private investors sometimes drive hard bargains, and exercise life or death 
power over distressed businesses that are in no position to cavil.  If we 
permit that kind of intervention to happen in the private sector, the question 
is whether we should treat the government, when it invests, any differently. 
  Indeed, many of the things 
the government can do by regulation, investors can do by contract.  
Investors can — and often do — change the way the executives of the firm 
are compensated, for example, more strictly than has the government.  
They might order the sale of lines of businesses (the government apparently 
has not), loot the company by ordering large dividend or debt repayments 
(again, no evidence of this), and so on. 
Furthermore, to the extent the government has generally acted as a 
silent partner even while retaining its stake longer than strictly necessary, it 
has followed the playbook that sensible private investors might employ in 
order to maximize their return.  Fire sales are not usually sales at the best 
price.  Nor is the fact that the government has not exited immediately 
anything new in the history of its oversight of insolvent institutions.  The 




(June 1, 2009, 12:56 PM). 
  Given the modesty of supervision by the government-as-
investors, and the precedent offered by government investments in failing 
financial intermediaries in the past through the FDIC, it is difficult to 
conclude that the lingering aftermath of the bailout should strike us as 
particularly troubling. 
 38. See William A. Birdthistle & M. Todd Henderson, One Hat Too Many?  Investment 
Desegregation in Private Equity, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 45 (2009) (discussing vulture 
investing). 
 39. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(i)(2006) (defining “new bank” and “bridge bank”). 
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III. RESOLUTION AUTHORITY 
“Resolution authority” is the polite term for seizing failing banks and 
thrifts, and either shutting them down or selling them off for the best 
possible price.40  Either way, when the government resolves a financial 
institution, it essentially nationalizes it, but in ways that the depositors 
rarely notice—at least not immediately.  Banks tend to fail on Fridays and 
on Monday are open under new management, usually with new signs on 
the door and with the same old depositors in the books, entirely intact.41  
During the financial crisis, hundreds of banks and thrifts failed in this way, 
and were then subjected to the tender care of the FDIC.42




There were very few controls over some of the resolutions that 
happened during the crisis.  In addition to the FDIC seizures, the 
government also employed a sort of cajoling “wink and nudge” resolution 
authority by forcing sales of a number of institutions (notably Wachovia 
and Bear Stearns) without bothering to go through the limited 
administrative process required before seizing them.
  They ask, as we might ask: what if the government 
seizes a bank that actually has some going concern value, wipes out the 
shareholders, pays them nothing, and does so on a whim, without any 
process?  What kind of remedies and controls should we exercise over the 
government before it does so? 
44  In the case of Bear 
Stearns, the forced sale came at a very low share price, essentially wiping 
out the shareholders.45
Resolution authority is, indeed, a strong government power, exercised 
broadly and widely during the crisis.  And it can be improved.
  So the European worry about uncontrolled 
resolution authority might seem to be a pertinent one. 
46
 
 40. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Treasury Proposes Legislation for 
Resolution Authority (Mar. 25, 2009), http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg70.htm. 
  But even 
 41. Paul Kiel, Bank Failure Friday:  Nine Banks, One Big Failure, PROPUBLICA, Oct. 
31, 2009, http://www.propublica.org/ion/bailout/item/bank-failure-friday-nine-banks-one-
big-failure-1031. 
 42. See ProPublica, Failed Banks List, http://projects.propublica.org/tables/failed-
banks/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2010) (charting failed banks); Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, Failed Banks List, http://www.fdic.gov/bank/individual/failed/banklist.html 
(last visited Mar. 20, 2010)(collecting list of banks that have failed since Oct. 1, 2000). 
 43. For the European perspective, see Apanard Angkinand & 
Clas Wihlborg, Bank Insolvency Procedures and Market Discipline in European Banking, 
(Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Fin. Insts. at Copenhagen Business Sch., Working Paper 2005-
2006), available at 
http://openarchive.cbs.dk/bitstream/handle/10398/6798/wplefic062005.pdf?sequence=1. 
 44. Davidoff & Zaring, supra note 6. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Additional checks on the government are needed, both before and after the decision, 
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without reform, is resolution authority a sign that the government is 
unwilling to let private markets work?  It is not without precedent.  The 
FDIC and state banking regulators have been closing insolvent institutions 
for years, and the constitutionality of resolution authority has been upheld 
time and again.47  Moreover, the ability of the government to swoop in and 
seize an insolvent institution is not the end of the story.  For example, the 
government both resolved and bailed out Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, 
zeroing out their shareholders, but paying their creditors 100 cents on the 
dollar – in that case, the nationalization treated some stakeholders very 
well.  Moreover, private sector insolvencies are hardly immune from fast 
and brutal workouts and cramdowns.48
Moreover, resolutions authority’s long pedigree is due to the sense 
that it is the flip side of a good deal for private investors.  One of the 
reasons why banks and thrifts (and their stocks) have done so well over the 
last few years is because they have federal deposit insurance.  When 
investors take shares in banks or thrifts, they not only get cheap money in 
the form of the depositor's note, they have the protection of the FDIC, 
which makes it even cheaper.  It is not unreasonable then that the 
advantages of owning an institution like a bank or a thrift should come with 
some costs.  After all, this is a regulated industry, and one of those costs is 
that the owner must to submit to the possibility of resolution authority. 
 
In addition, while resolution authority is a dramatic government 
action, the government rarely uses it outside of financial crises, so it is not 
as if there has been any tradition of government nationalization run amok.49  
While hundreds of institutions have been resolved during the past several 
decades, the vast majority of these occurred during the savings and loan 
crisis of the 1980's, or during the present crisis.50
 
to nationalize a financial institution.  I would propose making a list of potentially 
nationalizable institutions public ex ante, and then ex post permitting the owners of the 
seized institutions a brief window in which they could buy their institutions back from the 
government with whatever resources they can obtain.  This proposal would add both a 
process check and a market check to this most severe form of decision-making.  These pre-
deprivation and post-deprivation proposals would alleviate the constitutional problems 
presented by enhanced resolution authority and would help to ensure that the resolution 
process is used accurately, and where needed.  David Zaring, A Lack of Resolution, 60 
EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2010). 
  In between the end of the 
 47. See generally Christopher T. Curtis, The Takings Clause and Regulatory Takeovers 
of Banks and Thrifts, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.  376 (1990) (discussing the compensation 
required by the Takings Clause during government takeovers of banks); FDIC v. Mallen, 
486 U.S. 230 (1968) (analyzing due process). 
 48. For an overview of the insolvency regime, see Carol J. Perry, Note, Rethinking 
Fannie and Freddie's New Insolvency Regime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1752 (2009). 
 49. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, DECEMBER OVERSIGHT REPORT: TAKING 
STOCK: WHAT HAS THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF FUND ACHIEVED 45 (2009), available at 
cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-120909-report.pdf. 
 50. Id. 
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savings and loan crisis in 1992 and the peak of the current crisis in 2008 
however, the federal government used its authority almost never.51  In 
short, while resolution authority is real government intervention in the 
private marketplace, there is no worrisome trend, it arguably constitutes a 
fair bargain for investors in a regulated industry when paired with deposit 
insurance, and making it better is attainable, as I argue elsewhere.52
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
I have attempted to present the “worst,” albeit real and emblematic, 
cases of public involvement in the private sector after the bailout.  If you do 
not recoil at these interventions, you may safely assume that post-bailout 
government — where it is extricating itself from the financial sector 
slowly, where it is cautiously and minimally regulating executive 
compensation by example, and where at some points it is swooping in and 
seizing institutions that it deems to be insolvent—is not an example of a 
death of capitalism or even an example of the inefficiency of regulation. 
Indeed, I think an alternative approach by the government might look 
more inefficient.  It would be inefficient for the government to sell its 
stakes in these financial institutions at the first opportunity.  The fast 
bankruptcies offered by resolution authority are efficient ways to resolve 
financial institutions as quickly as possible and with relatively little 
inconvenience to the contagion-prone financial sector; counterparties and 
correlated intermediaries would prefer a government with resolution power 
to one with only recourse to clumsy bankruptcy.53  Moreover, few firms are 
unfamiliar with the concept of a workout or a cramdown.  While executive 
compensation regulation is potentially serious, what the government has 
implemented — largely tailored packages of deferred stock designed to 
lead by example — is the kind of thing that banks, investment banks, and 
private equity firms increasingly do themselves,54
 
 51. Id. The government has tended to fail institutions when times are bad, such as in the 
1980s and during the current financial crisis, but not when they are good; the agency’s 
resolution authority bureau all but closed up shop between 1995 and 2005, in two of those 
years failing no institutions at all, and over the decade failing fewer than it did in the year 
1993 alone.  For a list of resolutions done by the FDIC over the past thirty years, see Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation, Failures and Assistance Transactions, 
http://www2.fdic.gov/hsob/HSOBSummaryRpt.asp?BegYear=2010&EndYear=1980&State
=1 (last visited Feb. 7, 2010). 
 and is both modest and 
 52. Zaring, supra note 46. 
 53. Zaring, supra note 46. 
 54. Most of the most senior executives of investment banks in 2009 took home most of 
their pay in deferred stock.  Christine Harper and Michael J. Moore, Goldman Sachs’s 
Blankfein Receives $9 Million Bonus for 2009, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 6, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601108&sid=atcUs6E1p6ck.  This concept is 
not new to investment banking. 
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perceived to be a useful (and even efficient) method for control and 
incentivization of corporate executives.55
One way to think about government interventions in the post-crisis 
financial markets is to ask:  what would private investors do?  Would they 
wait to sell quickly?  Are they willing to embrace the possibility of a 
cramdown?  Do they want to align the incentives of management with their 
own longer-term incentives?  I think the answer to all of these questions is 
yes.  The difference between those investors and the kinds of investment 
and other involvements by the government in financial institutions can 
easily be overstated.  It has never been clear whether government 
bureaucrats are so different than large corporate bureaucrats, in both their 
daily incentives (such as promotion and the ability to go home at a 
reasonable hour), and in the lives they lead as organizational people.  There 




 55. John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers:  The Strain In The Corporate 
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 75 (1986) (“[T]he use of deferred compensation reduces the 
incentive for the manager to shirk or consume excessive perquisites and makes it possible to 
factor into the amount of compensation information not currently available (such as the 
eventual success or failure of a long-term research or marketing project.”). 
  If that is 
true, then perhaps we should not worry if government officials act the way 
that private businesses – such as Hollywood – might in their only 
somewhat new engaged role in the financial sector. 
 56. Wonkette, [Blank] for [Blank] People, http://wonkette.com/114667/blank-for-
blank-people (July 27, 2005, 20:06 PM) (noting that comedians have long stated 
Washington is “Hollywood for ugly people”). 
